You may have noted that the right-wing are constantly referring to the left-wing agenda spouted by comedians on 'panel shows' and the lack of right-wing comedians being given air time by the 'liberal' media. They frequently show a lack of enthusiasm for satirical depictions of their arguments, as anyone would, but to a greater degree than most well balanced and thoughtful individuals would bordering on the paranoid. This explains, in my opinion, exactly why they are so resistant to any critical analysis of their ideological position. How humour can subvert the conservative position which attempts to reinforce the dominant position of the social class that they represent. It also serves the purpose of providing an argument for why we on the left should once more find our funny bones.
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The superiority theory is one of three competing theories that
attempt to define the purpose of humour in society and was the
dominant understanding of humour from antiquity until the end of the
enlightenment era in the 18th century. Throughout this
period laughter was viewed with suspicion and the scholars
throughout history sought ways to control, limit, or even eradicate
laughter from society, or at the minimum high society. Most of these
scholars believed that laughter had the power to subvert the existing
hierarchy of power; they believed it was a form of rebellion. The
Greek philosophical teachings of Plato and Aristotle will be examined
first, which will show how in ancient Greece the philosophers
believed that the humour of the masses inverted the hierarchical
position of society by allowing for the ridiculing of the scholars,
doctors and other elites by the masses. The theologian perspective on
laughter will follow this and explain how a significant proportion of
middle-age theologians believed that ridicule, laughter, and above all
Carnival, had no place in Christianity. They believed if you were to correctly
follow the teachings of God you were to discipline your body. To
absolve yourself of sin they believed you must restrain from raucous
laughter. Thomas Hobbes thoughts on humour and its understanding in
the context of psychology will be presented next which will argue
that all laughter, not only the laughter of the masses, is
anti-social and inherently unpleasant, due to the purpose of laughter
being the confirmation of the ridiculer being in a superior position
in relation to another. Once the superiority theory has been
presented, through the writings of key thinkers accredited with the
largest influence upon its establishment as an influential theory on
humour, the counter arguments will prove why they were wrong to
distrust the social effects of humour and why humour serves a strong,
useful, and positive purpose in society.
Superiority theorists claim that humour is used by people within
society to mock and attack the object of the joke, comedy or humorous
quip. They were concerned with the effects of uncontrolled and vulgar
forms of laughter, and object to humour on the pretence that it was
offensive to either religious traditions, theological arguments, or to
the established social order and the social hierarchy that defined
the upper echelons of society as being naturally superior. The
position of laughter as an oppositional force to the ethical
understanding of the world can be characterised to fit into the
prevalent moral and ethical code of the particular culture it resided
within, from the ancient Greek philosophers and their ethics of
virtue, the religious middle ages and the ethics of royalty and god,
through to the enlightenment and modern societies understanding of
ethics, those of Kant and Bentham (Morreall, 2005). Most superiority
theorists believed that wit and controlled laughter could serve a
social function if used by the elite classes in their particular
epoch to discipline those who were in a morally indefensible
position. As such the superiority theorists were not opposed to all
forms of humour, they merely wished to reduce the frivolous elements
of humour and preserve the correct and serious mannerisms that were
considered to be considerably evident in the more desirable
characteristics of the elite and educated members of society.
The earliest form of what is called 'superiority theories' of humour
emerged from ancient Greece and its philosophical teachings by
Aristotle, Plato and Socrates. These philosophisers were concerned by
the social effects of laughter and its ability to subvert the social
hierarchy as they considered the frivolity associated with much of
the laughter in society to be unethical or below what individuals in
society should aspire to be. In contending that there was too much
laughter in the world they did not oppose all forms of laughter, they
conceded, in contrary to today's accepted standard of humour that
laughter, that ridiculing others could be beneficial to society as a
punishment within reasonable and acceptable situations, for example
if a friend displays an “ignorance-based vain conceit of beauty,
wisdom or wealth” (Zillmann, 1983: 86). This does not extend to the
concept of schadenfreude, as it is known today, as joy should not be
derived from the misfortune of those who are not your friends or
equals. The idea of an idealised state run by philosophers was
discussed by Socrates; this Platonic idea would see the states
superiors strictly control the lower orders of society, to ensure
they treated their superiors with the respect they commanded. One of
the ways this would be achieved was through the promotion of the
seriousness of life amongst society, as such “laughter was one of
the pleasures to be tightly controlled, particularly the sort of
impertinent laughter that mocks authority” (Billig, 2005: 41). This
seriousness of life extended beyond the subordinate sections of this
ideal society to those who would deemed the higher orders of society
who would be discouraged from engaging in unchecked frivolity,
including representations of elites such as gods in literature,
advocating an acceptable censorship in society that would remove such
influences over future generations of educated superior elements of
society. This should be relaxed in certain circumstances as laughter
could provide a useful function in this idealised republic, in
circumstances where laughter could mock undesirable depictions of
masculinity, for example, the higher orders in this republic should
“laugh in the serious interests of morality, truth and discipline”
(Billig, 2005: 41). This may seem paradoxical but it was not the
witty and disciplinary forms of humour that Plato believed were
incompatible with an idealised republic; it was the baser forms of
carnivalesque humour associated with the lower ranks of society,
which mocked their superior’s culture and knowledge, such a
philosophy, the doctors, and other scholars (Bremmer, 1997). This they
believed was counter-productive to the rigidity of the established
class divide of society, by engaging in this sort of laughter at
their superiors expense they were subverting the important class
hierarchy of society, the respectful discipline that was demanded of
the lower echelons of society must be maintained at all times, at
least in respect to their superiors. Their codes for laughter and
ridicule ensured that people remained embedded within this hierarchy,
echoed by the myths of the gods, that amongst other things
“contributes to keeping society stable and 'normal'” (Gilhus,
1997: 33).
Aristotle differed slightly from both Plato in his understanding of
laughter, they however both argued that the need for a curtailing of
undesirable laughter was important to the continued improvement of
Greek society and that it was desirable to mock certain elements of
society that required that reaction. For Aristotle this was the
essence of comedy, which aimed to induce mockery and laughter at
those who are inferior when compared to yourself, precisely because
by depicting the comedic character as ugly or deformed, meaning that
they are ethically or socially inferior according to standards in
ancient Greece, the audience is encouraged to feel superior to the
character and laughter is permissible. This would only occur on the
stipulation that the misfortune and “the laughable is an error or
disgrace that does not involve pain or destruction” (Bekker in
Heath, 1996: 62) and that these characters were “the lowly persons
(such as peasants and slaves) who are only peripheral in tragedy; and
comic characters, even those of high status, will tend to behave
badly” (Heath, 1996: 62). This laughing at the ugly or deformed was
considered to be buffoonery, a form of humour that was considered to
be the preserve of the lower ranks of Greek society. Similarly to
Plato, wit was the encouraged form of humorous exchange which
Aristotle explained could be a useful tool in the art of persuasion
in 'Rhetoric', continuing the class based assumptions that the
educated higher class should only engage in the morally superior and
acceptable forms of humour and avoid the less civilised buffoonery
engaged in by the lower orders in Greek society. This was to be
maintained, even at the expense of the effectiveness of the argument,
as the preservation of the correct social mannerisms was imperative
when engaging in conversation with an individual of similar social
standing. The higher orders of society should never engage in
buffoonery in order to “maintain standards of taste and class”
(Billig, 2005: 44). Aristotle believed that there was too much humour
exhibited by people within Athenian society, they must learn to
moderate humour into correct and acceptable levels, and that people, for
Aristotle, were morally obliged to do this. In doing so they should
shun all buffoonery and engage in wit and irony befitting their
social standing, this distinguishing of good and bad forms of humour
was steeped in the social hierarchy that attributed the base forms of
humour with the negative connotations associated with the lower
social groups.
The distinguishing between good and bad humour did not end with the
ancient Greeks, many Christian theologians throughout history have
contemplated the subject of humour in what could be considered the
“long tradition of grim theologians” (Billig, 2005: 48) with
contempt towards its frivolous nature, in particular the long
standing tradition of carnival. Like the ancient Greek philosophers,
theologians too conceded that some laughter could serve a moral
purpose or was permissible if restrained and joyous. The exact
opposite of the raucous laughter enjoyed by the masses in carnival.
The middle-age theologians believed that in serving God in a
righteous manner humans were supposed to be disciplined in body and
in soul, this extended to laughter as they thought that by laughing a
person would be taking “the first step on the road to perdition”
(Gilhus, 1997:62). Theologians believed that by continuing the
unbridled pagan traditions associated with the raucous celebration of
the body during Carnival, the masses were risking god's disdain due
to the inherent vulgarity of this festival. Many within the Christian
faith believed that by continuing this tradition and revelling in the
festivities you were not serving the church and God in their intended
manner, “Carnival and 'Easter laughter' were viewed by many as a
pagan leftover, to be driven out of Christian lands” because they
had the potential subvert the word of God as “a satirical society
could use them for critical comments on Church and state” (Screech,
1997: 226). It was ridicule at the expense of the heathens that was
to be acceptable, as God himself would delight in such activities.
Theologians looked towards the ancient Greek philosophers to
understand the place of humour in society, a leading understanding of
laughter that they drew upon was one reading of Socrates that they
understood as being good laughter was that “laughter in God and Man
comes from the perception of ignorance in the butt of their laughter”
(Screech, 1997: 62). For the theologians this reading endorsed the
laughter of the pious whilst neglecting, and therefore rejecting, the
carnivalesque laughter of the masses. They believed that both Plato
and Socrates were inspired by God, that they were foreshadowing his
arrival on Earth, the logos; as such they were prescribed a
significant amount of authority over Christian discourses surrounding
laughter (Screech, 1997). It is here that the links between the
Christian theological perspective and the ancient Greek philosophers
on laughter can be observed, both traditions believed in the
importance of a seriousness to their social dealings, they were
similar in believing there was far too much laughter in their
respective societies, they both believed that the raucous laughter of
the masses was morally and ethically undesirable to the accepted
standards of high class behaviour in their particular epoch,
additionally they believed that with the right person and moral
guidance laughter could serve a purpose in society as a tool to
ridicule those who do not conform to their norms.
Thomas Hobbes provides a psychological explanation of humour in that
he departs from the earlier superiority theorists who yielded
acceptability to certain forms of humour, the account of that Hobbes
devised viewed all laughter as having negative consequences for
society. This does not exclude all similarities between their
understandings of humour as both Hobbes and Aristotle identified the
same object of the laughter, the butt of the laughter being those who
are weak or deformed, but for Hobbes it was the weak who laughed at
the weaker (Zillmann, 1983). In this understanding of laughter, it is
the consequence of selfish desires which constructs all motivation in
life; all we do for others is a reflection of this. This is where
humour enters into his discussion on the human and of human
selfishness, as the instinct to laugh at those much less fortunate
than the perceived self in comparison, he writes that humour to those
who “are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are
forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the
imperfections of other men” (Hobbes cited in Wickberg, 1998: 48).
What Hobbes is explaining is that in comparing ourselves to another
person who we perceive as inferior or more unfortunate we experience
pleasure, the psychological effect of this encourages laughter, we do
so to feel superior to that individual and laugh at their position
relative to our own. In this Hobbes argued the inherent objectionable
quality of humour is exposed, because ridicule and mockery are key
components of humour it like other virtuous actions were selfishly
motivated, for him “laughter for 'nothing else' but sudden glory,
just as goodness was nothing else but self interest” (Billig, 2005:
52) regardless of whether the humour is typified by the high class
witticisms vaunted by other superiority theorists. In comparing
yourself to an 'inferior' person you were not fulfilling your human
potential, for Hobbes it was more fruitful to relinquish the selfish
act of laughter to compare yourself to an intellectual or moral
superior in an attempt to better yourself and escape the small minded
mentality of those who engaged in humour. Hobbes' view was that laughter
was anti-social in nature, he perceived it as a form of rebellion
that had the potential to subvert society’s order (Billig, 2005).
Whilst the superiority theorist correctly identified the source of
much laughter as being derogatory to another individual, or their respective social
class, and identified its corrective potential, they ignored some of
the most important elements of laughter and humour. The absence of
recognition for innocent forms of humour such as word play or
incongruity, arising from bizarre situations not involving another person, points to an inability for the superiority theory to
explain correctly the purpose of laughter to an individual and
society. More importantly, the superiority theory assumes that all
social change and comment as the result of laughter or humour is
implicitly negative, this is problematic as rational, modern
societies openly encourage reflective critique of their social
structures, thus improving failing systems and validating the
existence of those which pass the test. A joke can look at a
particular social structure and reveal its true nature, what was
thought as being acceptable and rational can be revealed to be the
exact opposite, thus asking for reflection upon the existence of the
structure or practise. It is here that the power of laughter is
revealed and why the early Greek and Christian superiority theorists
incorrectly feared the power of laughter as an agent for social
change, as “humour can change the situation in which we find
ourselves, and can even have a critical function with respect to
society” (Critchley, 2002: 10). They feared it destroying the social
order of their epochs, rather than embracing its corrective, rational
potential. The early superiority theorists believed that ridicule in
witty retorts could work as a disciplinary mechanism to correct
undesirable characteristics in people, but they focused upon the
right of high status individuals to exercise this power over ‘lesser’
individuals to ensure the continuation of the existing social order.
The phenomenon of parody, which has existed since Greece, had the
potential to change the social order for the better through language. The power of parody in language “is like its natal genre of
epideictic speech: the public formalization of language beside itself
puts social conventions on display for collective reflection”
(Hariman, 2008: 251). If this is the case then all forms of parody,
including some elements of buffoonery, would serve a useful and
corrective function for their society, irrespective of whether it
originated in high or low status groups. In essence, early
superiority theorists were neglecting laughter’s seriousness
embedded in a shroud of foolishness. The Hobbesian understanding of
superiority theory too is not without problems, which states that
laughter is simply self-congratulation when we favourably compare a
weakness in another to ourselves; it is laughter of derision. This is
proven false, as although much humour does arise from this
comparison a significant proportion of what humans find laughable
comes not from a comparison with perceived weakness in another but
from incongruities, enjoyable group or individual situations and the
aforementioned political or social satire, thus containing little to
no malice. In all of these examples it is not laughter derived from a
selfish desire to reduce the position of another person, they are
social rather than psychological, they serve the purpose of group
bonding or even in achieving altruistic goals. So humour “need not
be self-evaluative any more than action need be
self-serving”(Morreall, 1983: 14).
The superiority theorists developed an understanding of the effects
of laughter upon their society that suited their world-view; they
believed wrongly that laughter would have a negative impact upon the
lives of the individuals that lived within their society. By
developing a theory or understanding of laughter that placed
suspicion upon it they failed to identify how laughter and humour
could work as a mechanism for positive social change, by labelling
laughter as the preserve of the foolish or small minded individuals
they rejected the insight of social structures that could be
discerned from the humour that ridiculed irrational aspects of
society. The early superiority theorists believed that seriousness
was the only morally and ethically defensible position for an
intellectual, somewhat paradoxically promoting the use corrective
laughter which identified a weakness in another and attacking them as
the only positive form of laughter, rather than buffoonery that
contained elements of thoughtful social critique. The attempts to
suppress or discourage the carnival celebrations of the masses,
similarly to the worry over the Grecian hierarchy being subverted by
baser forms of humour, was raised from the concern with the social
effects of the festivals to mock the traditions of the Christian
faith. Additionally, like the Greek philosophical tradition, they
believed that a serious and disciplined body was to be encouraged for
the preservation of the correct lifestyle for Christians, in this
they reduced the traditional celebrations and its social critique to
frivolous neglect of the spiritual role the church should adopt.
Finally, whilst Thomas Hobbes correctly identified the source of much
laughter being unethical in its hurtful relationship between the
superior and inferior subjects of the laughter he failed to address
the innocent and positive aspects of laughter. By predominantly
addressing the phenomenon of laughter in psychological terms he
refused to confront the important social aspects inherent in the
production of laughter and humour, those of group bonding and
non-derisive self-reflection. Due to these weaknesses and oversights
in the superiority theorists thoughts, their distrust of the
social effects of laughter cannot be considered to be the correct
position to have taken towards laughter and humour, by refusing to
confront the positive aspects of laughter they rejected the powerful
and effective results that are evident in some elements of humour.
References
Billig, M. (2005). Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Humour. London: Sage.
Bremmer, J. (1997). Jokes, Jokers and Jokebooks in Ancient Greek Culture. In: Bremmer, J and Roodenburg, H. A Cultural History of Humour: From Antiquity to the Present Day. Cambridge: Polity Press. 11-28.
Critchley, S. (2002). On Humour. London: Routledge.
Gilhus, I. S. (1997). Laughing Gods, Weeping Virgins. London: Routledge.
Hariman, R. (2008). Political Parody and Public Culture. Quarterly Journal of Speech. 94 (3). 247-272.
Heath, M. (1996). Poetics. London: Penguin Books.
Morreall, J. (1983). Taking Laughter Seriously. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Morreall, J. (2005). Humour and the Conduct of Politics. In: Lockyer, S and Pickering, M. Beyond a Joke: The Limits of Humour. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 63-78.
Screech, M. A. (1997). Laughter at the Foot of the Cross. London: Penguin Books.
Wickberg, D. (1998). The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America. London: Cornell University Press.
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