Laughter And Superiority

You may have noted that the right-wing are constantly referring to the left-wing agenda spouted by comedians on 'panel shows' and the lack of right-wing comedians being given air time by the 'liberal' media. They frequently show a lack of enthusiasm for satirical depictions of their arguments, as anyone would, but to a greater degree than most well balanced and thoughtful individuals would bordering on the paranoid. This explains, in my opinion, exactly why they are so resistant to any critical analysis of their ideological position. How humour can subvert the conservative position which attempts to reinforce the dominant position of the social class that they represent. It also serves the purpose of providing an argument for why we on the left should once more find our funny bones.

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The superiority theory is one of three competing theories that attempt to define the purpose of humour in society and was the dominant understanding of humour from antiquity until the end of the enlightenment era in the 18^th century. Throughout this period laughter was viewed with suspicion and the scholars throughout history sought ways to control, limit, or even eradicate laughter from society, or at the minimum high society. Most of these scholars believed that laughter had the power to subvert the existing hierarchy of power; they believed it was a form of rebellion. The Greek philosophical teachings of Plato and Aristotle will be examined first, which will show how in ancient Greece the philosophers believed that the humour of the masses inverted the hierarchical position of society by allowing for the ridiculing of the scholars, doctors and other elites by the masses. The theologian perspective on laughter will follow this and explain how a significant proportion of middle-age theologians believed that ridicule, laughter, and above all Carnival, had no place in Christianity. They believed if you were to correctly follow the teachings of God you were to discipline your body. To absolve yourself of sin they believed you must restrain from raucous laughter. Thomas Hobbes thoughts on humour and its understanding in the context of psychology will be presented next which will argue that all laughter, not only the laughter of the masses, is anti-social and inherently unpleasant, due to the purpose of laughter being the confirmation of the ridiculer being in a superior position in relation to another. Once the superiority theory has been presented, through the writings of key thinkers accredited with the largest influence upon its establishment as an influential theory on humour, the counter arguments will prove why they were wrong to distrust the social effects of humour and why humour serves a strong, useful, and positive purpose in society.

Superiority theorists claim that humour is used by people within society to mock and attack the object of the joke, comedy or humorous quip. They were concerned with the effects of uncontrolled and vulgar forms of laughter, and object to humour on the pretence that it was offensive to either religious traditions, theological arguments, or to the established social order and the social hierarchy that defined the upper echelons of society as being naturally superior. The position of laughter as an oppositional force to the ethical understanding of the world can be characterised to fit into the prevalent moral and ethical code of the particular culture it resided within, from the ancient Greek philosophers and their ethics of virtue, the religious middle ages and the ethics of royalty and god, through to the enlightenment and modern societies understanding of ethics, those of Kant and Bentham (Morreall, 2005). Most superiority theorists believed that wit and controlled laughter could serve a social function if used by the elite classes in their particular epoch to discipline those who were in a morally indefensible position. As such the superiority theorists were not opposed to all forms of humour, they merely wished to reduce the frivolous elements of humour and preserve the correct and serious mannerisms that were considered to be considerably evident in the more desirable characteristics of the elite and educated members of society.

The earliest form of what is called 'superiority theories' of humour emerged from ancient Greece and its philosophical teachings by Aristotle, Plato and Socrates. These philosophisers were concerned by the social effects of laughter and its ability to subvert the social hierarchy as they considered the frivolity associated with much of the laughter in society to be unethical or below what individuals in society should aspire to be. In contending that there was too much laughter in the world they did not oppose all forms of laughter, they conceded, in contrary to today's accepted standard of humour that laughter, that ridiculing others could be beneficial to society as a punishment within reasonable and acceptable situations, for example if a friend displays an “ignorance-based vain conceit of beauty, wisdom or wealth” (Zillmann, 1983: 86). This does not extend to the concept of schadenfreude, as it is known today, as joy should not be derived from the misfortune of those who are not your friends or equals. The idea of an idealised state run by philosophers was discussed by Socrates; this Platonic idea would see the states superiors strictly control the lower orders of society, to ensure they treated their superiors with the respect they commanded. One of the ways this would be achieved was through the promotion of the seriousness of life amongst society, as such “laughter was one of the pleasures to be tightly controlled, particularly the sort of impertinent laughter that mocks authority” (Billig, 2005: 41). This seriousness of life extended beyond the subordinate sections of this ideal society to those who would deemed the higher orders of society who would be discouraged from engaging in unchecked frivolity, including representations of elites such as gods in literature, advocating an acceptable censorship in society that would remove such influences over future generations of educated superior elements of society. This should be relaxed in certain circumstances as laughter could provide a useful function in this idealised republic, in circumstances where laughter could mock undesirable depictions of masculinity, for example, the higher orders in this republic should “laugh in the serious interests of morality, truth and discipline” (Billig, 2005: 41). This may seem paradoxical but it was not the witty and disciplinary forms of humour that Plato believed were incompatible with an idealised republic; it was the baser forms of carnivalesque humour associated with the lower ranks of society, which mocked their superior’s culture and knowledge, such a philosophy, the doctors, and other scholars (Bremmer, 1997). This they believed was counter-productive to the rigidity of the established class divide of society, by engaging in this sort of laughter at their superiors expense they were subverting the important class hierarchy of society, the respectful discipline that was demanded of the lower echelons of society must be maintained at all times, at least in respect to their superiors. Their codes for laughter and ridicule ensured that people remained embedded within this hierarchy, echoed by the myths of the gods, that amongst other things “contributes to keeping society stable and 'normal'” (Gilhus, 1997: 33).

Aristotle differed slightly from both Plato in his understanding of laughter, they however both argued that the need for a curtailing of undesirable laughter was important to the continued improvement of Greek society and that it was desirable to mock certain elements of society that required that reaction. For Aristotle this was the essence of comedy, which aimed to induce mockery and laughter at those who are inferior when compared to yourself, precisely because by depicting the comedic character as ugly or deformed, meaning that they are ethically or socially inferior according to standards in ancient Greece, the audience is encouraged to feel superior to the character and laughter is permissible. This would only occur on the stipulation that the misfortune and “the laughable is an error or disgrace that does not involve pain or destruction” (Bekker in Heath, 1996: 62) and that these characters were “the lowly persons (such as peasants and slaves) who are only peripheral in tragedy; and comic characters, even those of high status, will tend to behave badly” (Heath, 1996: 62). This laughing at the ugly or deformed was considered to be buffoonery, a form of humour that was considered to be the preserve of the lower ranks of Greek society. Similarly to Plato, wit was the encouraged form of humorous exchange which Aristotle explained could be a useful tool in the art of persuasion in 'Rhetoric', continuing the class based assumptions that the educated higher class should only engage in the morally superior and acceptable forms of humour and avoid the less civilised buffoonery engaged in by the lower orders in Greek society. This was to be maintained, even at the expense of the effectiveness of the argument, as the preservation of the correct social mannerisms was imperative when engaging in conversation with an individual of similar social standing. The higher orders of society should never engage in buffoonery in order to “maintain standards of taste and class” (Billig, 2005: 44). Aristotle believed that there was too much humour exhibited by people within Athenian society, they must learn to moderate humour into correct and acceptable levels, and that people, for Aristotle, were morally obliged to do this. In doing so they should shun all buffoonery and engage in wit and irony befitting their social standing, this distinguishing of good and bad forms of humour was steeped in the social hierarchy that attributed the base forms of humour with the negative connotations associated with the lower social groups.

The distinguishing between good and bad humour did not end with the ancient Greeks, many Christian theologians throughout history have contemplated the subject of humour in what could be considered the “long tradition of grim theologians” (Billig, 2005: 48) with contempt towards its frivolous nature, in particular the long standing tradition of carnival. Like the ancient Greek philosophers, theologians too conceded that some laughter could serve a moral purpose or was permissible if restrained and joyous. The exact opposite of the raucous laughter enjoyed by the masses in carnival. The middle-age theologians believed that in serving God in a righteous manner humans were supposed to be disciplined in body and in soul, this extended to laughter as they thought that by laughing a person would be taking “the first step on the road to perdition” (Gilhus, 1997:62). Theologians believed that by continuing the unbridled pagan traditions associated with the raucous celebration of the body during Carnival, the masses were risking god's disdain due to the inherent vulgarity of this festival. Many within the Christian faith believed that by continuing this tradition and revelling in the festivities you were not serving the church and God in their intended manner, “Carnival and 'Easter laughter' were viewed by many as a pagan leftover, to be driven out of Christian lands” because they had the potential subvert the word of God as “a satirical society could use them for critical comments on Church and state” (Screech, 1997: 226). It was ridicule at the expense of the heathens that was to be acceptable, as God himself would delight in such activities. Theologians looked towards the ancient Greek philosophers to understand the place of humour in society, a leading understanding of laughter that they drew upon was one reading of Socrates that they understood as being good laughter was that “laughter in God and Man comes from the perception of ignorance in the butt of their laughter” (Screech, 1997: 62). For the theologians this reading endorsed the laughter of the pious whilst neglecting, and therefore rejecting, the carnivalesque laughter of the masses. They believed that both Plato and Socrates were inspired by God, that they were foreshadowing his arrival on Earth, the logos; as such they were prescribed a significant amount of authority over Christian discourses surrounding laughter (Screech, 1997). It is here that the links between the Christian theological perspective and the ancient Greek philosophers on laughter can be observed, both traditions believed in the importance of a seriousness to their social dealings, they were similar in believing there was far too much laughter in their respective societies, they both believed that the raucous laughter of the masses was morally and ethically undesirable to the accepted standards of high class behaviour in their particular epoch, additionally they believed that with the right person and moral guidance laughter could serve a purpose in society as a tool to ridicule those who do not conform to their norms.

Thomas Hobbes provides a psychological explanation of humour in that he departs from the earlier superiority theorists who yielded acceptability to certain forms of humour, the account of that Hobbes devised viewed all laughter as having negative consequences for society. This does not exclude all similarities between their understandings of humour as both Hobbes and Aristotle identified the same object of the laughter, the butt of the laughter being those who are weak or deformed, but for Hobbes it was the weak who laughed at the weaker (Zillmann, 1983). In this understanding of laughter, it is the consequence of selfish desires which constructs all motivation in life; all we do for others is a reflection of this. This is where humour enters into his discussion on the human and of human selfishness, as the instinct to laugh at those much less fortunate than the perceived self in comparison, he writes that humour to those who “are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men” (Hobbes cited in Wickberg, 1998: 48). What Hobbes is explaining is that in comparing ourselves to another person who we perceive as inferior or more unfortunate we experience pleasure, the psychological effect of this encourages laughter, we do so to feel superior to that individual and laugh at their position relative to our own. In this Hobbes argued the inherent objectionable quality of humour is exposed, because ridicule and mockery are key components of humour it like other virtuous actions were selfishly motivated, for him “laughter for 'nothing else' but sudden glory, just as goodness was nothing else but self interest” (Billig, 2005: 52) regardless of whether the humour is typified by the high class witticisms vaunted by other superiority theorists. In comparing yourself to an 'inferior' person you were not fulfilling your human potential, for Hobbes it was more fruitful to relinquish the selfish act of laughter to compare yourself to an intellectual or moral superior in an attempt to better yourself and escape the small minded mentality of those who engaged in humour. Hobbes' view was that laughter was anti-social in nature, he perceived it as a form of rebellion that had the potential to subvert society’s order (Billig, 2005).

Whilst the superiority theorist correctly identified the source of much laughter as being derogatory to another individual, or their respective social class, and identified its corrective potential, they ignored some of the most important elements of laughter and humour. The absence of recognition for innocent forms of humour such as word play or incongruity, arising from bizarre situations not involving another person, points to an inability for the superiority theory to explain correctly the purpose of laughter to an individual and society. More importantly, the superiority theory assumes that all social change and comment as the result of laughter or humour is implicitly negative, this is problematic as rational, modern societies openly encourage reflective critique of their social structures, thus improving failing systems and validating the existence of those which pass the test. A joke can look at a particular social structure and reveal its true nature, what was thought as being acceptable and rational can be revealed to be the exact opposite, thus asking for reflection upon the existence of the structure or practise. It is here that the power of laughter is revealed and why the early Greek and Christian superiority theorists incorrectly feared the power of laughter as an agent for social change, as “humour can change the situation in which we find ourselves, and can even have a critical function with respect to society” (Critchley, 2002: 10). They feared it destroying the social order of their epochs, rather than embracing its corrective, rational potential. The early superiority theorists believed that ridicule in witty retorts could work as a disciplinary mechanism to correct undesirable characteristics in people, but they focused upon the right of high status individuals to exercise this power over ‘lesser’ individuals to ensure the continuation of the existing social order. The phenomenon of parody, which has existed since Greece, had the potential to change the social order for the better through language. The power of parody in language “is like its natal genre of epideictic speech: the public formalization of language beside itself puts social conventions on display for collective reflection” (Hariman, 2008: 251). If this is the case then all forms of parody, including some elements of buffoonery, would serve a useful and corrective function for their society, irrespective of whether it originated in high or low status groups. In essence, early superiority theorists were neglecting laughter’s seriousness embedded in a shroud of foolishness. The Hobbesian understanding of superiority theory too is not without problems, which states that laughter is simply self-congratulation when we favourably compare a weakness in another to ourselves; it is laughter of derision. This is proven false, as although much humour does arise from this comparison a significant proportion of what humans find laughable comes not from a comparison with perceived weakness in another but from incongruities, enjoyable group or individual situations and the aforementioned political or social satire, thus containing little to no malice. In all of these examples it is not laughter derived from a selfish desire to reduce the position of another person, they are social rather than psychological, they serve the purpose of group bonding or even in achieving altruistic goals. So humour “need not be self-evaluative any more than action need be self-serving”(Morreall, 1983: 14).

The superiority theorists developed an understanding of the effects of laughter upon their society that suited their world-view; they believed wrongly that laughter would have a negative impact upon the lives of the individuals that lived within their society. By developing a theory or understanding of laughter that placed suspicion upon it they failed to identify how laughter and humour could work as a mechanism for positive social change, by labelling laughter as the preserve of the foolish or small minded individuals they rejected the insight of social structures that could be discerned from the humour that ridiculed irrational aspects of society. The early superiority theorists believed that seriousness was the only morally and ethically defensible position for an intellectual, somewhat paradoxically promoting the use corrective laughter which identified a weakness in another and attacking them as the only positive form of laughter, rather than buffoonery that contained elements of thoughtful social critique. The attempts to suppress or discourage the carnival celebrations of the masses, similarly to the worry over the Grecian hierarchy being subverted by baser forms of humour, was raised from the concern with the social effects of the festivals to mock the traditions of the Christian faith. Additionally, like the Greek philosophical tradition, they believed that a serious and disciplined body was to be encouraged for the preservation of the correct lifestyle for Christians, in this they reduced the traditional celebrations and its social critique to frivolous neglect of the spiritual role the church should adopt. Finally, whilst Thomas Hobbes correctly identified the source of much laughter being unethical in its hurtful relationship between the superior and inferior subjects of the laughter he failed to address the innocent and positive aspects of laughter. By predominantly addressing the phenomenon of laughter in psychological terms he refused to confront the important social aspects inherent in the production of laughter and humour, those of group bonding and non-derisive self-reflection. Due to these weaknesses and oversights in the superiority theorists thoughts, their distrust of the social effects of laughter cannot be considered to be the correct position to have taken towards laughter and humour, by refusing to confront the positive aspects of laughter they rejected the powerful and effective results that are evident in some elements of humour.

References

Billig, M. (2005). Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Humour. London: Sage.

Bremmer, J. (1997). Jokes, Jokers and Jokebooks in Ancient Greek Culture. In: Bremmer, J and Roodenburg, H. A Cultural History of Humour: From Antiquity to the Present Day. Cambridge: Polity Press. 11-28.

Critchley, S. (2002). On Humour. London: Routledge.

Gilhus, I. S. (1997). Laughing Gods, Weeping Virgins. London: Routledge.

Hariman, R. (2008). Political Parody and Public Culture. Quarterly Journal of  Speech. 94 (3). 247-272.

Heath, M. (1996). Poetics. London: Penguin Books.

Morreall, J. (1983). Taking Laughter Seriously. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Morreall, J. (2005). Humour and the Conduct of Politics. In: Lockyer, S and Pickering, M. Beyond a Joke: The Limits of Humour. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 63-78.

Screech, M. A. (1997). Laughter at the Foot of the Cross. London: Penguin Books.

Wickberg, D. (1998). The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America. London: Cornell University Press.

Zillman, D. (1983). Disparagement Humour. In: McGhee, P. E and Goldstein, J. H. Handbook of Humor Research. New York: Springer-Verlag. 85-108.